Case studies are used to reflect on the treatment of patients with dementia hospitalized at the Geriatric Department of the Faculty hospital in Prešov, emphasizing human dignity in clinical practice. The discussion is focused on the palliative care of patients with severe dementia. The biomedical method, which respects human dignity is defined by means of inductive, deductive, and normative bioethical methods. They make it possible to provide guidelines for palliative care and individualized prognosis strategy. An analysis of health status of (...) individuals with severe dementia enables us to offer a clinical definition of purposeful treatment based on normative justice and decision-making that reflects the patient’s best interest, thus respecting their dignity. An evaluation of a patient’s care is based on a biomedical method that considers the dementia stage. Applying a bioethical model in a holistic context preconditions the human rights of patients with dementia. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 229-276.

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

Introduction: Fundamental Ontology as a "Fundamental Ethics" In his "Letter on Humanism" Martin Heidegger claims that the fundamental ontology he works out ...

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and (...) Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order (...) to explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:196 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in 1943, was to write an Epilogue to Julian Marias' History o] Philosophy. In early 1944, the Epilogue was conceived as a volume of 400 pages, and later of 700. In 1945 a part of the Epilogue was to be detached and given the title The Origin ol Philosophy. Then one completed part of that was published in 1953 as an essay in a Festschrift (...) for Karl Jaspers. That, and other sections, have been put together here. The first part of the book treats philosophy as a cumulative enterprise in which each man rethinks and thinks further what other men have thought. Even when past thought has reached an end, or taken a direction we will not follow, it is only for the reason that it has already happened that we do not have to do it ourselves. This is not because history is rational but because thought is historical, rooted in ideas we did not ourselves create and based on methods we have acquired and sometimes altered. The second part of the book deals with the origin of philosophy--and the origin of "philosophy" for Ortega is concerned throughout with language and etymology. The word "philosophy" is not one Ortega likes; he prefers the word "aletheia," which was used by Parmenides and his contemporaries. In popular language, aletheia meant discovery, exposure, denudation, revelation. For the thinker, "aletheia" is "truth" as a verb, the activity of uncovering reality, which is concealed under the robes of appearance or falsehood. Philosophy, for Ortega, begins with Parmenides and Heraclitus; "proto-philosophers" he calls them. The Ionians had been scientists; their attempts at natural explanation upset religion and tradition, and prepared the way for philosophy. In a remarkably subtle and complex analysis for so short a space, Ortega argues that skepticism, atheism, wealth, and knowledge of nature created a freedom based on a need to create or choose one's own beliefs in a world in which relative abundance demands choice, since in poverty "an individual is never in the position of being able to choose; for choice assumes that the circle of one's possibilities is notably greater than that of one's needs" (p. 98). The social need to define the thinker and so grant him professional status that might minimize the hostility of the tradition-ridden and reactionary populace, especially in Athens, led to the name "sophist," which became disreputable to a hostile citizenry, and then to "philosopher." Socrates was, unfortunately, the only philosopher, the man who liked, had a taste for, or loved wisdom, but made no pretense that he had any, saying only he sought it. But the name persisted, and helped institutionalize the new profession. I haven't even intimated the delight of Ortega's incidental insights. He was probably justified in believing that his stature as a thinker was much greater than his reputation. A first-rate, full-scale study of Ortega in English would help, but what we need most is a collection and translation of his complete works. RSLPH ROSS ~cripps College Discourse on Thinking. By Martin Heidegger. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 93. $3.50.) This is a translation of a speech and conversation originally published under the thematic title Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1959). Heidegger uses this unusual German word to remind us that there is another way of thinking than the calculative and dialectical modes made prominent by the mathematical sciences and modem cultural philosophy respectively. We have forgotten a less busy mode of thinking, a thinking released from all desire to control reality. Gelassenheit is rendered throughout as "releasement" in this translation. But Gelassenheit does not just mean letting go, or freedom from, as "releasement" may suggest. It also has the more positive sense of composure and a patient letting things be. In the context of Heidegger's attempts to define a mode of thinking not concerned with dominating reality, Gelassenheit comes to mean the freedom to be open to reality. BOOK REVIEWS 197 Heidegger stresses the ability to wait for insight, which is not, however, a mere passive waiting for something fixed. It would be... (shrink)

Professor Strawson was interviewed on video on location at King's College, London during the Spring of 1992. Professor Strawson discusses his thoughts on a variety of topics on which he has written previously, providing some illuminating insights into how his thoughts has progressed. The text published here is en excerpt from this interview, translated with kind permission of Mr Rudolf V. Fara, the producer, in which prof. Strawson discusses his philosophical views with Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental (...) Philosophy at Oxford University, and Mark Sainsbury, Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at King's College, University of London. (shrink)

Two of the most brilliant German thinkers of the twentieth century were Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann. Jaspers, the philosopher, and Bultmann, the theologian, were both influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the rise of the existentialist movement. Late in their careers they interacted on the subject of Bultmann's attempt to divest Christianity of its mythical components and make sense of it in more modern terms. This work is a compilation of articles by Jaspers and Bultmann (...) that formed a running debate originally published in various scholarly journals. The first half of the book is Jaspers' lengthy and critical analysis of Bultmann's interpretation of Christianity, in which Jaspers essentially rejects the premise that Christianity or any other religion can or should be understood without its mythical framework. Jaspers charges that Bultmann has radically misunderstood the nature of myth and that myth is an irreplaceable form of symbolic communication. In the second part, Bultmann defends his approach, suggesting that Jaspers has not really understood his intent or meaning. Contemporary people today, schooled in the scientific tradition, are likely to reject the biblical texts because of their miraculous claims and supernatural content. Bultmann insists that the scholarly, scientific study of the Bible is a legitimate way to reveal its true message, apart from all the supernatural trappings. Finally, in response, Jaspers accepts some of Bultmann's clarifications but takes him to task on the subject of justification by faith, which he feels Bultmann defines too narrowly and too exclusively. This stimulating work by two penetrating minds will give anyone interested in perennial philosophical and theological questions much to ponder. (shrink)

Die Investiturstreit-Episode in der Alexias Anna Komnenes ist bemerkenswert detailliert. Neben der Kontroverse um die Simonie, wird auch die Frage der Rechtbzw. Unrechtmäßigkeit des Pontifikats Gregors VII. thematisiert, ebenso die Gegenkönigserhebung Rudolfs von Rheinfelden, die Schlacht an der Weißen Elster, der Tod des Gegenkönigs sowie das Bündnis zwischen Gregor VII. und Robert Guiscard. Der Normannenherzog ist der Anknüpfungspunkt der Autorin für die Ereignisse des Investiturstreits, der Grund dafür, dass dieser westliche Konflikt für sie von Bedeutung ist. Anna Komnenes Bericht erhält (...) jedoch auch Sondergut, Ereignisse, die sich nicht mit den westlichen Quellen in Einklang bringen lassen. Ein bedeutender Teil dieses Sonderguts ist insbesondere gegen Gregor VII. gerichtet, so etwa dessen Misshandlung der Gesandten Heinrichs IV., aber auch die suggerierte Teilnahme des Papstes an der Schlacht an der Weißen Elster. Diese antipäpstliche Tendenz dominiert die gesamte Episode. Sie wird nicht zuletzt an der Art und Weise deutlich, wie Anna Komnene das Aufeinandertreffen zwischen Gregor VII. und Robert Guiscard darstellt. Sie gestaltet die Begegnung als Herrschertreffen und übt somit massive Kritik an Papst Gregor VII., der sich demnach als weltlicher Herrscher geriert. Die Autorin gebraucht die stilistischen Mittel der Ironie und des Spotts, um Gregor in ein negatives Licht zu rücken. Sie präsentiert Gregor als Erfinder unmenschlicher Strafen, als überheblichen Barbaren, als Herrscher und Feldherrn, nie jedoch als einen sich seines Amtes würdig erweisenden Geistlichen. Der Umstand, dass Gregor VII. niemals beim Namen genannt, sondern anonym lediglich als 'Papst' bezeichnet wird, ist mehr als eine 'damnatio memoriae'. Durch Gregors Anonymisierung beschränkt sich die Kritik in der Alexias nicht auf das Individuum 'Gregor VII.', sondern sie wird im Gegenteil ausgeweitet auf die institutionelle Ebene des Papsttums. Die Schlechtigkeit und Boshaftigkeit Gregors VII., also des Papsttums überhaupt, in der Alexias verstärkt sich noch, wenn man diesem Verhalten dasjenige des konstantinopolitanischen Patriarchen gegenüberstellt. Ein Vergleich des in der Alexias geschilderten Verhaltensmusters des 'römischen Patriarchen' mit dem täglich erlebten Verhaltensmuster des 'konstantinopolitanischen' drängte sich dem Rezipienten der Alexias geradezu auf, so dass das päpstliche Verhalten als ὕβρις erscheinen musste. (shrink)

Carlos Astrada’s early thought is characterized by a fundamental concern: the possibility, for human beings, of establishing new “ideals” and “values” capable of supplanting the old, capitalist ones. The aim of this article is to identify the different scopes of Astrada’s concept of ideal. In the first section, some bases to consider the philosophy of life underlying the Astradian theoretical proposals are established. The article will thereafter be divided into three other sections, which follow the chronology of Astrada’s works. In (...) the first part, the “ideal” is conceptually treated as an operative element in history, for which it is considered to what extent Jean-Marie Guyau would have influenced Astrada’s thought, something neglected by the existing literature. The second part deals with the relationship between the concepts of “ideal” and “life”. It will be shown how Astrada aimed to challenge the “idealist” and “empiricist” positions, which he considers equally unilateral to elaborate an ethics according to “the new times”. Astrada would have looked for an “intermediate position” between both perspectives, i.e., what he called “vital synthesis”. This could have been possible thanks to a philosophical dialogue with Georg Simmel, Manuel García Morente, José Ortega y Gasset, and Oswald Spengler. In the third part, the ideal is analyzed as an element capable of giving a guiding sense to the growing accumulation of human activities, marked by specialization, in an operation that can be interpreted under the romantic key of “recovering” the Totality. For this, the philosophical dialogue that Astrada had with both Georg Simmel and Rudolf Eucken is analyzed. (shrink)